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SOME NOTES FOR AN ANARCHIST THEORY OF TRADE

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The main subject of social economy - that is, the economy of energy required for the satisfaction of human needs - is the last subject which one expects to find treated in a concrete form in economical treaties. - Peter Kropotkin

On the face of it how can anyone be opposed to 'free trade' as long as it doesn't occur on a Sunday? This would seemingly be the position of the church going back over the centuries. St. Augustine seemed to be saying as much when he argued trade to be evil if pursued by clergymen, for sinful purposes such as 'forestalling' or if indulged in at such 'times that ought to be devoted to divine service and prayer, such as Sundays and Festivals' But there was no cause for concern if it was 'pursued honestly for the purpose of supplying our fellow-man with the goods he needs'. Who could disagree? Trade was thus presented as an almost altruistic act of self-sacrifice where the trader's concern was for his 'fellow-man' rather than narrow self-interest.

More cynically perhaps we might interpret such views as another example of how the church was coming to terms with the growing reality of trade at the time. By permitting and endorsing trade the principle of profit was being accepted via the back door as the reward to the 'labour' of the trader.

The idea of usury or profit was clearly unacceptable but as the urge to trade moved from the local to the distant the church clearly felt a need to move with the times, and seek a language of subterfuge. This indeed is the history of the discussion of 'free trade' which continues to this day - occasionally varying its vocabulary but always plugging the same story.

Terms such as 'price-specie flow', 'comparative advantage' or 'factor-proportions theories' simply turn out to be the preferred jargons of different eras chosen to hide a different reality - recognised ultimately (almost as a footnote by many) - as being that of the exploitation of the weak by the strong via the protectionist policies of a state leading to polarisation and inequality rather than the mythological convergence of free trade economics. Students of Orwell will find many examples of newspeak in the works of 'free trade' economists.

But already we are introducing so much of the jargon which is used to hide the reality without stripping away the veneers of respectability to reveal the essential fraudulence of most economic theory.

We could argue about where to begin. Aristotle could serve us well but it would seem to be safe to come closer to the modern era and start - if not chronologically then analytically - with David Hume and the beginnings of convergence theory which stands as the attempt to put a moral stamp of approval on the theory of 'free trade'.

EARLY THEORIES

Few would wish to argue that it be fair for one economy to exploit another in order to render it completely subservient and to condemn its inhabitants to little more than slavery. Reality needs to be rearranged, dressed up, re-packaged before it presents itself as theory, even Hitler had Goebells to push the Nazi argument in acceptable form, and whatever the realities of 'free trade' it needs in some way to be made palatable.

So, if it can be shown that such exploitation and slavery is impossible what better ideology could one hope for? All can be acceptable in this Panglossian world where if the rich try to exploit the poor they receive their come-uppance in due course. Hume puts the argument in the following passage:

Suppose four-fifths of all the money in GREAT-BRITAIN to be annihilated in one night, and the nation reduced to the same conditions, with regard to specie, as in the reign of the HARRYS and EDWARDS, what would be the consequence? Must not the price of all labour and commodities sink in proportion, and everything be sold as cheap as they were in those ages? What nation could then dispute with us any foreign market, or pretend to navigate or to sell manufactures at the same price, which to us would afford sufficient profit? In how little time, therefore, must this bring back the money which we had lost, and raise to us the level of all neighbouring nations? Where, after we have arrived, we immediately lose the advantage of the cheapness of labour and commodities; and the further flowing in of money is stopped by our fullness and repletion.

Again, suppose, that all the money of GREAT BRITAIN were multiplied fivefold in a night, must not the contrary effect follow? Must not all labour and commodities rise to such an exorbitant height, that no neighbouring nations could afford to buy from us; while their commodities, on the other hand, became comparatively so cheap, that, in spite of all the laws which could be formed, they would be run in upon us, and our money flow out; till we fall to a level with foreigners, and lose that great superiority of riches, which has laid us under such advantages.

As with so much of economic theory Hume's argument sits in a Platonic underworld of mathematical certainty. Here lies the essential premise of the 'free trade' argument: there can only be winners. Still today despite the evidence it is still repeated. Any advantage gained is in the long run an advantage lost. In the formulaic world of economics this is powerful stuff, virtually unchallengeable. However, back in the real world, it holds no water.

You won't get far into your reading of economic theory without hitting a caeteris paribus : all things being equal. The world of economics is a world of theories which deal with two nations and two commodities. It is a world where European military superiority is not a factor in any equation, a world where the CIA does not install puppet r_gimes, a world where imprisoned labour is not used in the production process, a world where carpet bombings of defenceless civilian populations do not occur, a world free of apartheid, concentration camps and special economic zones - it is in essence a world free of political constraint and state interference that is to say an ahistorical supposition lacking reference to reality. Hume accidentally hits on this point in the above when he brings in the limitation, 'in spite of all the laws which could be formed,' Here he underestimates, seriously, the ability of power to dictate the terms of 'free trade'.

Indeed, remove political considerations, and you come close to the ideal: free trade which, it has been argued, was the reality for most of world history, until the ascendency of the Europeans.

This is not to say that all economic theorists simply operate in such a vacuum and that no more sophisticated argument can be found. Indeed Hume had his contemporaries who denied his arguments. He was challenged directly by the Dean of Gloucester, Josiah Tucker (1712-1799), who recognised the pre-conditions and consequences of 'free trade'. For Tucker the idea that a rich nation could lose advantage to a poorer one conjured up the most terrible nightmares:

THIS being the case, can it be denied, that every poor Country is the natural and unavoidable Enemy of a rich one; especially if it should happen to be adjoining it? And are we not sure beforehand, that it will never cease from draining it of its Trade and Commerce, Industry and Manufactures, 'till it has reduced it, at least so far as to be on a Level and Equality with itself? Therefore the rich Country, if it regards its own Interest, is obliged by a Kind of Self-defence to make War upon the poor one, and to endeavour to extirpate all its Inhabitants, in order to maintain itself in statu quo, or to prevent the fatal Consequences of losing its present Influence, Trade and Riches. For little less than a total Extirpation can be sufficient to guard against the Evils to be feared from this dangerous Rival, while it is suffered to exist....

For Tucker such a state of affairs was unimaginable. His reasoning, however, is only too predictable:

For my part, I must confess, I never could conceive that an all-wise, just, and benevolent Being would contrive one Part of his Plan to be so contradictory to the other, as here supposed;- that is, would lay us under one Obligation as to Morals, and another as to Trade...

Many readers will be disappointed. God for the Dean of Gloucester, as has been pointed out, was more British than Hume's more cosmopolitan variety but for those who would like to bring the argument into a more concrete domain we still have failed to dodge the reality of state power.

Still, although Tucker had inadvertently pointed to the realpolitik of the situation without perhaps realising its importance, he does begin to come up with some pointers which also undermine the 'free trade' argument whilst moving closer to a kind of theory of protectionism - which he never fully endorsed.

We are now near the heart of the nature/nuture debate which has successfully dominated economic theory over the years. It is the argument between liberalism and protectionism; between laissez-faire economics and, as its main opponent Adam Smith was to dub it, mercantilism. Anachronistically Tucker was a mercantilist, a hard bunch to define but one which seems to have defined itself by putting an emphasis on accumulation of gold bullion and treasure seen as the essence of wealth; a dedication to the regulation of foreign trade to produce an inflow of these precious metals; the promotion of industry by ensuring cheap imports of raw materials; protective duties on imports of manufactured goods and an emphasis on high population growth to ensure low wages.

Such policies were geared most essentially to producing 'surplus' of a kind which would clearly bring profit to those engaged in foreign trade - perhaps not surprisingly mercantilists themselves - but also with considerable advantage to the state which was to play such a fundamental role. One important aspect here, which we must stress, was acquisition, of precious metals which a favourable balance of trade would allow therefore to increase the money supply and provide the new ruling class with the means to control the economy and command the labour of others.

Thus the mercantilists must be respected at least for living in the real world - one of state intervention in economic activity. It was only when their work was done, as Tucker had pointed out, that the stage could be set for those who would call for open markets and 'free trade'. Protectionism having done its job 'leader nations' as they are now called could be let loose on the world knowing that their leading position was virtually unassailable.

The realism of their position partly explains the willingness of so-called 'free-traders' like Adam Smith to ignore them and set up straw-men instead to shoot down as more identifiable targets. For the 'free-traders' , an unreal universe is drawn of a market with an 'invisible hand' which will find its own natural level - a universe where there are no long term winners and losers and where all would come out in the wash. Where this universe exists we have yet to find out. History tells a different story. It is a story of state led trade - of protectionism and acquired rather than natural advantage as recognised by the mercantilists - precursors of the protectionist school.

CLASSICAL LIBERALISM

Such Machiavellianism and realism though could not be right for the domain of academic discussion. Theories which discussed a need to control foreign economies were unpalatable. The unreal world of the 'free market' was needed to set the limits of discussion. Enter Adam Smith and David Ricardo to justify an unjustifiable state of affairs.

Smith is not of immediate concern to trade theory but we wish to make some comment on him here given as he is so often seen as the father of modern economics . We need to consider both halves of this equation before we consider his ideas; unfortunately all too briefly - we hope to return to them some other time.

Firstly, of course, to speak of modern economics is to recognise a multiplicity of economic models only good in so far as they satisfy a need for a coherent description of a given state of affairs. They are therefore essentially descriptive rather than normative; the latter belonging more properly to the fields of politics and ethics and carry with them attendant cultural and historic limitations.

Secondly, however, to portray Smith as an economist is to portray only half the man. There is also the normative side to his work which gives a far different picture to that commonly presented of him. We would remember here that Smith took over the chair of Moral Philosophy - once held by his tutor Professor Hutcheson - in 1747 and that the fruit of this period was his book The Theory of Moral Sentiments which is faithfully overlooked by many of his would-be disciples in our times. We intend to consider both sides of Smith in the following in order to present a more complete picture of the man who whilst describing an economic system he saw evolving also noted its damaging side.

Traditionally of course one starts with chapter one of The Wealth of Nation and Smith's important principle of labour division. We will however, break with tradition in order to draw attention to the more fundamental principle of Smith's description i.e. an economy based on exchange-value.

Smith certainly recognised both use and exchange value. He gives simple examples of the former - air and water - and diamonds as an example of the latter. The first is recognised as useful but without exchange value and the second as useless but worth a penny or two. Smith is only interested in the latter. This highlights two related aspects of the forgoing argument. Firstly, in an economy which was beginning to feel the problem of agricultural supply to be approaching the excess of supply over demand - partly due no doubt to a fortunate series of harvests from 1730 to 1750 - scarcity needed to be found in other areas in a society where technology from our point of view was embryonic and that therefore the question of industrial production needed to be addressed. In agriculture a problem solved was not a problem and therefore of little interest. (This could be contasted with the French and the Physiocratic position.) But also this strange and unresolved paradox of scarcity in a system of surplus which gives rise to the Smithian notion of exchange value seemingly can only be explained in a context of class analysis.

But having raised these themes we can now afford to be a little more traditional and give you page one, paragraph one:

The greatest improvement in the productive powers of labour, and the greater part of the skill, dexterity, and judgement with which it is anywhere directed, or applied, seem to have been the effects of the division of labour .

But then of course we could have begun elsewhere:

[under the division of labour the worker]... has no occasion to exert his understanding, or to exercise his invention... He naturally loses therefore, the habit of such exertion, and generally becomes as stupid and ignorant as it is possible for a human creature to become. The torpor of his mind renders him, not only incapable of relishing or bearing a part in any rational conversation, but of conceiving any generous, noble or tender sentiment, and consequently of forming any just judgement concerning many even of the ordinary duties of private life... His dexterity at his own particular trade, seems in this manner to be acquired at the expense of his intellectual, social, and martial values. But in every improved and civilised society this is the state into which the labouring poor, that is, the great body of the people, must necessarily fall, unless government takes some pains to prevent it.

Both sides of Smith can be seen at work on this problem which clearly perplexed him. Throughout his work there is a tension between, as many would put it, what his head told him was required and what his heart told him this would entail. We will look at the economic implications he draws from the situation momentarily but let us dwell here on what seems to be an essential dilemma for him which he seems content to reveal without necessarily solving. Does this writer come closer to solving the problem?

With regard to the amount of prosperity and business activity in them, cities and towns differ in accordance with the different size of their civilisation [population]. The reason for this is that, as is known and well established, the individual human being cannot by himself obtain all the necessities of life. All human beings must co-operate to that end in their civilisation. But what is obtained through the co-operation of a group of human beings satisfies the need of a number many times greater than themselves. For instance, no one, by himself, can obtain the share of the wheat he needs for food. But when six or ten persons, including a smith and a carpenter to make the tools, and others who are in charge of the oxen, the ploughing of the soil, the harvesting of the ripe grain, and all other agricultural activities, undertake to obtain their food and work toward that purpose either separately or collectively and thus obtain through their labour a certain amount of food, that amount will be food for a number of people many times their own. The combined labour produces more than the needs and necessities of the workers.

Not only does Khaldun writing hundreds of years earlier seem to grasp the nature of the economics - which this time is universal rather than temporary - but he combines it with a concept of mutual aid and by so doing brings us closer to the idea of integrated labour as proposed by anarchists like Kropotkin which is not the opposite to Smith's notion but the resolution of the problem he faced to which we now return.

Smith's notion of labour division should not be seen as simplistic. Firstly, Smith was concerned with those 'employed in useful labour... and those not so employed'. This in itself would seem a 'useful' distinction at first but proves somewhat disappointing given the definition of that which is useful which we understand, must give rise to the production of tangible objects (including presumably useless diamonds) which in turn could give rise to surplus or profit for future investment. Indeed it is this aspect which lies at the heart of the theory rather than the division of labour. Labour is now defined as productive only in so far as it produces goods of exchange value which are therefore useful in the area of trade. We would stress here that it is not so much labour division which lies at the core of Smith's system but rather it is this notion of exchange giving rise to trade that we have already highlighted. In the Universe of The Wealth of Nations the division of labour is useful in so far as it produces commodities for a trading nation. Value lies in exchange and not in need - it is this attitude towards value which distinguishes Smith from Kropotkin not labour division - but we are still left with another paradox which lies behind Smith's system. How do we produce surplus for trade when there is by definition scarcity - the bedrock of economic theory?

The concept of surplus can be readily understood if need has been satisfied but otherwise the concept seems only to make sense in a divided society where the needs of some are met - who can then enjoy surplus - whilst others want. Smith calls on government or the state to enforce this unequal state of affairs. Whose side does he come down on in this struggle between rich and poor? Even in the economic pages the following creeps in:

[the proposals of new laws or regulations by dealers] ... ought always to be listened to with great caution, and ought never to be adopted till after having been long and carefully examined, not only with the most scrupulous, but with the most suspicious attention. It comes from an order of men, whose interest is never exactly the same with that of the public, who have generally an interest to deceive and even oppress the public, and who accordingly have, upon many occasions, both deceived and oppressed it.

In his own words Smith undermines the title of his own book. We are not talking of the wealth of nations we are talking of the wealth of sectional interests. This theme will come through more clearly as we turn to Ricardo and the international division of labour.

COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE

With David Ricardo (1772-1823) we introduce one of economics most famous laws - the law of comparative advantage - which is generally credited with having first been formulated by this wealthy stockbroker and parliamentarian. It is from this law that the basic claim of the mutual advantage of trade to different countries is inferred. It goes somewhat like this.

If we take two countries - Britain and Portugal (the two which Ricardo actually chose) and consider their industrial production of cloth and wine and if we consider in particular their various endowment factors (climate, supply of raw materials, labour capital etc.) we should naturally discover that one of them is better at producing a given commodity that the other. If in our example Portugal is better at producing wine and Britain cloth we are looking at an example of absolute advantage and it is fairly obvious that mutually beneficent trade or exchange can here take place. But supposing Portugal be better than Britain at the production of both commodities. Here Ricardo's theory of comparative advantage suggests that because the efficiency is relative increased specialisation will still bring advantage to both countries. We can highlight this with a numerical example. Consider for example the USA and Peru both using all their resources to produce coca leaves. Imagine we get the following outputs:

USA- 1000 tonnes

Peru - 2000 tonnes.

Now consider them both producing cotton with these outputs:

USA - 1000 tonnes

Peru - 1000 tonnes

Now putting aside half a dozen considerations which will spoil the fun but which we will turn to in a moment, why should Peru want anything to do with the USA? Well with the USA we can see that the cost of producing an extra ton of coca leaves will force them to cut back an equal tonnage on cotton whereas for Peru to produce an extra ton of coca leaves would mean half a ton cutback on cotton. Therefore Peru has a comparative advantage in coca leaf production and the USA has a comparative advantage in cotton production by default as it were because Peru is best positioned to specialise in coca leaves. Neat.

Fine as far as it goes but supposing, and this will not overstretch your imagination, that the USA has got a bunch of armed thugs called the CIA who will destroy your crop of coca leaves, seize your land, install a government of their own choosing and put you in prison if you protest. How useful is your comparative advantage in coca leaf production then? Consider further that having taken your land the USA then builds a factory to distribute cotton seeds to you and directs your government to ban you from producing your own seeds. What effect will this have on your cotton producing efficiency? And supposing the wife of the President of the USA gives away free cotton t-shirts with the slogan 'say no to coca leaf' to anyone who wanted one and got the media to support her.. At this point we could restate the question: why should Peru want anything to do with the USA?

Perhaps to be fairer to Ricardo we should take his example of Portugal during the eighteenth century - the age he would surely have had in mind. The political realities of the time had led England into an alliance with Portugal in 1702 in order to oppose Spanish power. The alliance included a trade agreement which was no new innovation having followed several treaties in the previous century. It was therefore in the words of the French historian Fernand Braudel the outcome of 'processes which eventually closed on Portugal like a trap'.

Portugal at the time was turning more towards her colony in South America: Brazil, from whom she was leeching such wealth that her king was the richest sovereign in Europe. This though, didn't spread throughout a population where the 'rich were excessively rich, and the poor wretched.' For the poor it was a nasty place for the rich it had become a palace of luxury which was to lead to depravation:

Into the lazy prosperity of this little country came the English and pressed home their advantage. They shaped Portugal to suit their own ends, developing the vineyards in the north, creating the fortunes of port wines; becoming sole providers of Lisbon's grain and codfish supplies; introducing enough bales of English cloth to clothe every peasant in Portugal, and to flood the distant market in Brazil. It was all paid for in gold and diamonds... Things might have been different; Portugal might have protected her own market and built up her own industry... But the English solution was the easy one. Even the terms of trade favoured Portugal: while the price of English cloth fell, that of Portuguese export goods rose...

And we can guess which social classes benefited from this. Braudel's conclusion rings down the ages to the present day:

When a foreign power has access to the first-hand market, at the point of production, that is indeed commercial colonisation.

THE ROOTS OF AUTARCKY

Distant trade, historically linked with colonialism, can be counterbalanced with the notion of autarky. This indeed lies at the base of the ideas of a Scot with dates similar to those of Smith - Andrew Fletcher of Saltoun (1653-1716). One could overestimate the anarchist overtones of his writings - but we can recognise in most of his pronouncements a libertarian feel born of a romanticism reflected by the events in his life. He was, like many of his time and social background, much travelled resulting in exposure to some of the less conventional ideas of his time. As a young man he returned to Scotland to take part in the abortive rebellion organised by Argyll and Monmouth. He was forced to flee and was in his absence condemned as a traitor by the Lord Advocate 'Bluidy' Mackenzie in 1686 and sentenced to death for treason. He was of course an ardent nationalist but as Istvan Holt has shown his understanding of the way powerful nations dominate weaker ones is astute and, apart from leading him to oppose the union, also brought him to consideration of more radical solutions to his nation's problems.

He argued that, notwithstanding their lower wage costs, smaller nations as the weaker partner would always lose out in trading relations with the greater states and with the callous destruction of the Irish textile industry he didn't have to look far for evidence to support his viewpoint. Wales too offered evidence as the following extract from his pamphlet 'An account of a conversation' shows

Wales, the only country that ever had united with England, lying at a less distance from London, and consequently more commodiously to participate in the circulation of a great trade than we do, after three or four hundred years, is still the only place of that kingdom, which has no considerable commerce, though possessed of one of the best ports in the whole island; a sufficient demonstration that trade is not a necessary consequence of a union with England.

Many will recognise here much of the thinking which goes into contemporary structuralist theory such as that of Frank. Indeed there is much in Saltoun's work which is far ahead of his time. He goes on to say that the English in order to protect their trade would need to prevent the Irish from trading and in a reductio ad absurdum suggests this would lead to the idea of depopulating it and in so far as this would invite French invasion it would be even better to, ' ...suppose Ireland sunk in the sea; and then you will cease to fear either that they may set up for themselves, or carry away the trade from England.' To go further the logic would suggest that Scotland and Wales follow suit and more...

Do you not think, said I, the same arguments would prove that all the considerable trade of the world might be brought into one city, and all mankind to live within and about that place?

Perhaps

For what end then, said I, did God create such vast tracts of land, capable of producing so great variety and abundance of all things necessary and useful to man? In order, I suppose, that these countries might not be inhabited, and that mankind might confine themselves to islands, strait, barren and unwholesome situations, and live upon trade. Can there be a greater disorder in human affairs... But if the governments of the world were well regulated, and men might have the liberty of choosing, they would not be confined to such narrow, barren, and unwholesome places, nor live so much at sea, or in the exercise of a sedentary and unmanly trade, to foment the luxury of a few; but would disperse themselves over the world in greater or lesser numbers, according to the goodness of the soil, and live in a more free and manly way, attended with a more equal distribution of riches than trade and commerce will allow. Trade is not the only thing to be considered in the government of nations: and justice is due, even in point of trade, from one nation to another.

Clearly Fletcher was beyond a parochial nationalism. His comments can readily be seen as far ahead of his time in an international context where he seemed to well understand the necessary logic of military and commercial conflict which would be the future for the European colonialists. 'Commerce assumed the shape of war,' he insisted, 'precisely because it was now considered not only to be a means of obtaining foreign luxuries or of making the common people more prosperous, but to be the foundation of military greatness and national glory...' He was arguing for genuine international commerce away from the confines of national interest emphasising the ideas of mutuality and exchange. Government could play no part in this vision:

Not only those who have ever actually formed governments, but even those who have written on that subject, and contrived schemes of constitution have, as I think, always framed them with respect only to particular nations, for whom they were designed, and without any regard to the rest of mankind. Since, they could not but know that every society, as well as every private man, has a natural inclination to exceed in everything, and draw the advantage to itself, they might also have seen the necessity of curbing that exorbitant inclination, and obliging them to consider the general good and interest of mankind, on which that of every distinct society does in a great measure depend. And one would think that politicians, who ought to be the best of all moral philosophers, should have considered what a citizen of the world is.

There is here a recognition of the intimate link between state injustice and trade even if it manifests itself as a negative cynicism. There is also though a more positive vision of more autarkic or self-reliant communities which could develop into a kind of Proudhonian federalism and what can only be referred to as free trade though the concept would be quite alien to those who spent 43 years and seven rounds before they could come up with an inferior definition.

Clearly the 'lead economies' would have to gain control of foreign domestic economies in a direct fashion if they were to keep them in a state of subservience and avoid what was seen as a threat: autarky, or inland trade or to add a couple of other terms - regional trade and/or self reliance.

KROPOTKIN

Much of Kropotkins' writings are also littered with this notion of autarky. Of course for many autarky is a nightmare, conjuring up visions at best of menial and primitive economic survival and at worst of Pol Pot and other authoritarian regimes amongst which one would include Nazi Germany. There is, however, perhaps more to it than this. I wish to oppose this idea of autarky to that of distant trade and Kropotkin, echoing Fletcher, is speaking of distant trade when he says, 'Grand it may be, but is it not a mere nightmare?' and further he asks, 'Is it necessary?'

Because for Kropotkin this vision of autarky (he doesn't use the word) or self reliance to use it's hurrah counterpart is indeed a welcome vision:

Each nation is a compound aggregate of tastes and inclinations, of wants and resources, of capacities and inventive powers. The territory occupied by each nation is in its turn a most varied texture of soils and climates, of hills and valleys, of slopes leading to a still greater variety of territories and races. Variety is the distinctive feature, both of the territory and its inhabitants; and that variety implies a variety of occupations. Agriculture calls manufactures into existence, and manufactures support agriculture. Both are inseparable; and the combination, the integration of both brings about the grandest results. In proportion as technical knowledge becomes everybody's virtual domain, in proportion as it becomes international, and can be concealed no longer, each nation acquires the possibility of applying the whole variety of industrial and agricultural pursuits. Knowledge ignores artificial political boundaries. So also do the industries; the present tendency of humanity is to have the greatest possible variety of industries gathered together in each country, in each separate region, side by side with agriculture. The need of human agglomerations correspond thus to the needs of the individual; and while a temporary division of labour remains the surest guarantee of success in each separate undertaking, the permanent division is doomed to disappear, and to be substituted by a variety of pursuits - intellectual, industrial, and agricultural - corresponding to the different capacities of the individual, as well as to the variety of capacities within every human aggregate.

The key word is variety which appears eight times even in this short passage which also contains the indicators of an alternative to Adam Smith. It is the very antithesis of classical liberal economics and the discredited notion of comparative advantage with its monocultures aimed at setting up our New World Order to draw surplus into the international exchange economy under state control be it national or global. This vision that Kropotkin had contains weaknesses for sure but it gives us enough food for thought and a starting point from which to build an alternative vision of the future as we approach the year 2000.

© Neil Birrell The Raven 31 pp247-261

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